I. Introduction
There are a great deal of studies on the four Asian NIEs (hereafter NIEs) -South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore in recent years. They are often characterized by sustained rapid economic growth for over three decades (OECD, 1979; Page, 1994; World Bank, 1993; Park and Park, 1989) . Since the late 1960s, they quickly entered the world production process, fended off oil crises, repulsed the competition from other developing countries, and resisted the rise of protectionist pressures in the developed countries. By 1996, Korea was admitted to the prestigious OECD countries. From 1960 to 1980 ), and also from 1980 to 1993, the average annual GNP per capita of Asian NIEs grew continuously from 5.4% to 8.2% (Column (10)), almost twice faster than the developed economies, and much faster than any other group of developing countries in the world .2 The contrast is clearer in the 1980-1993 period, during which the average annual growth rate of middle-income countries recorded mere 0.2%. The Asian NIEs, as well as the vast economies of the United States and Japan that ranked number one and number two in the world, respectively, have worked like magnetic. They lead other developing countries in the Pacific, and to a lesser extent, the Southeast Asian countries, to a massive positive growth of 6.4%. All other developing areas, especially Middle East and North Africa area (-2.4%), experienced a negative growth. For these other developing countries, convergence of per capita GNP to that of the developed countries is simply out of the question, as the developed countries have experienced respectable positive growth in both periods (3.6% and 2.2%, respectively).
The sustained economic growth and vitality of East Asian countries are clearly revealed in Table   1 . Here is an evidence of East Asian "miracle."
In 1994, however, Krugman (1994) has presented a contrariant view. With the risk of oversimplification, his argument may be summarized syllogistically: One, the NIEs' economic growth has been input-driven, that is, not attributable to technical progress or "efficient growth,"
and presents no economic miracle; Two, such growth "is inevitably subject to diminishing 3 returns," similar to what the former Soviet economy had experienced, which eventually collapsed; Three, therefore, there may not be "an Asian-centered world economy and geopolitics."
Krugman's first argument is based on total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate studies of other economists. We have discussed it elsewhere 3 (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1996) . This paper examines mainly his second argument, and to a lesser degree, the third point. While there are many discussions about Krugman's contention, there seem no thorough and systematic studies related to the role of diminishing returns in the Asian NIEs. We would like to show that, despite recent setback in economic growth due to the financial crises which makes his argument ominous, the Asian NIEs still have a long way to go to catch up with the OECD countries, especially Japan and the United States. While the measured TFP may be small, we shall show that the NIEs have been climbing up the technology ladder, the very factor that has enabled the NIEs to maintain their international competitiveness over the past three decades. They have absorbed technology through enhancement of education, openness through vigorous trade with Japan and the United States, and by attracting direct foreign investment, in addition to nurturing native technology through R & D. After they recover fully from the Asian financial crisis, barring from unforeseen political disturbance and world recession, there seems no reason why they could not resume solid growth in the future.
In Section II, three major strategies are suggested to delay diminishing returns. We assess the progress of education in the Asian NIEs and the ASEAN countries, and review the recent literature on the effects of openness on technology transfer and the total factor productivity growth. Section III emphasizes the features of the Pacific trade triangle formed among the NIEs, Japan, and the United States. The NIEs' industrial upgrading to higher-value-added manufactured good exports is examined. Section IV introduces revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index to show the industrial upgrading of the NIEs as a whole. We then discuss the difference in performance among the product groups and countries.
Section V ascertains empirically that technology transfer is a increasing function of direct foreign investment, and points out that the increased outflows of direct foreign investment among the Asian countries, especially from the NIEs to the Southeast Asian countries. These features have enhanced intra-and inter-regional economic integration in recent years, and contributed to today's dynamic economic activities in the Asian Pacific region, as compared with the Latin America and Sub-Saharan African countries. We then in Section VI introduce a simple model to show the coefficients of learning between Taiwan and Korea with Japan and the United States, and also Japan with the United States, to partially explain the difference in economic growth.
The coefficients of learning are introduced and estimated using polynomial distributed lag model. The last section concludes with an observation that technology not only did transfer to the NIEs, native technology also begins to burgeon through research and development. Thus, barring unforeseen political instability and economic disaster, the evidence suggests that it is rather difficult to imagine that, like the former Soviet economy, the economic vitality in the Asian Pacific region will cease in the foreseeable future.
II. On Diminishing Returns
The second part of Krugman's syllogism is that the law of diminishing returns will eventually set in for input-driven growth, as experienced by the former Soviet economy. This can be seen from the neoclassical assumptions on the production function Q = AF(N, K), where output (Q) is produced from labor (N), capital (K), and technology or total factor productivity (A). If marginal productivities of factors are positive, and the law of diminishing returns of factors and constant returns to scale hold, then, we may write the production function in per capita magnitude,
where q = Q/N, the output-labor ratio or average labor productivity, k = K/N, the capital-labor ratio, and f(k) = F(1, k). Hence, differentiating with respect to k, we have
where q' = dq/dk, f k = df/dk, the marginal productivity of capital, 4 and the law of diminishing returns of the capital-labor ratio holds. If the total factor productivity (TFP) A is held constant (that is, TFP growth rate (dA/dt)(1/A) = 0) in (1), then, an increase in the output-labor ratio q implies an increase in the capital-labor ratio k. However, (2) implies that function f(k) is a strictly concave function of k. As the capita-labor ratio k increases, q will increase at a decreasing rate, and it eventually will cease to increase. This will occur when k is very large.
However, even if k is small, in the neoclassical growth model of capital accumulation, the steady state growth of average labor productivity, q, eventually converges to the growth rate of TFP under the law of diminishing returns (at the well-known Solow's Cross). Constancy of TFP, or small growth rate of TFP, means no growth, or almost no growth, of the average labor productivity. Krugman thinks that this is what happened in the former Soviet economy, and will happen to the NIEs.
In both cases, the law of diminishing returns is the culprit of bringing the economy to halt. A check of the empirical implication of the law in the above two equations is revealing.
According to the Asian Productivity Organization (1995), among the Asian NIEs, the outputlabor ratio q in (1) increased between 42% and 56% from 1985 to 1993. Now, q' in (2) is the real rate of return on capital, or the real interest rate. According to IMF (1994) , from 1970 to 5 1992, the (simple) average real interest rate 5 among three Asian NIEs (excluding Hong Kong) was 6.3%, among the ASEAN-4 was 8.3%, while that of Japan was 4.1%, and the United States, 4.5%. Thus the real interest rates were generally higher among the NIEs and the ASEAN-4 during the past two decades.
However, according to (2), since the real interest rate is a decreasing function of the capital-labor ratio k, the high real interest rate among these Asian countries with constant TFP would have implied a low capital-labor ratio, and hence by (1), a low output-labor ratio. This is contrary to the fact that the labor productivity q has increased. Thus, so far as the neoclassical model is concerned, it is more natural and convincing to assume that TFP in the NIEs must have been increased so to maintain higher per capita output.
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As we will show in detail below, this indeed has been the case. In this paper, we do not dispute the iron law of diminishing returns, but ask whether the law can be postponed or avoided, and if so, whether the NIEs and the ASEAN countries are geared to do so. This question also relates closely to the characteristics of the growth of the NIEs, even the growth of Asian countries in general, and provide a sharp contrast with the former Soviet economy.
According to the endogenous theory of economic growth, 7 the law of diminishing returns may be put off temporarily or permanently by increases in endogenously determined quality of labor or capital or both, and upgrading of engineering/production and management/marketing technology (A in (1)). Quality of labor can be improved through education, on-the-job training (Washio, 1986; Lucas, 1993) , and students returned from abroad (reversed brain drain).
Introducing more efficient machine and equipment can enhance quality of capital. A country's technology can be elevated through domestic research and development activities and transfer of technology through international trade and investment. These improvements in quality of labor, capital, and technology are closely related and interdependent. In short, there are three major strategies to delay diminishing returns: Improvement in education, expansion in domestic research and development, increase in openness of the economy, including promotion of exports, imports, and direct foreign investment. These are some of the major factors which have not been considered explicitly in formal models of TFP growth, which is generally defined as the residual after the percentage contributions of labor and capital are accounted for in the growth rates of output.
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In stead of using formal models, there are no lack of them (e.g., see Hsiao and Hsiao, 1996) , this paper present mainly a qualitative analysis of the factors determining TFP, with the emphasis on education, openness, and direct foreign investment, research and development activity of East Asian development. These are some factors not easily and accurately measured by the conventional neoclassical model, resulting in small growth rate of TFP, and which leads to 6 Krugman's pessimistic prediction. A formal analysis can be found elsewhere.
A. Education
Recent research suggests that one of the important reasons that the Asian NIEs achieved rapid growth is a special initial condition that they had better educated labor force when their economy started to take off in the 1960s. Increase in the general educational level means easier and faster acceptance of new technology, better and smoother adaptation to new organization, thus increasing labor productivity of the economy.
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The heavy lines with circles in Figure 1 show 10 the actual ratios of primary, secondary and tertiary enrollments (relative to the corresponding age group) in 1960 for the NIEs, ASEAN-3 (that is, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, but not including Philippines), and Japan. The we may expect that the economy and technology transfer will also continue to grow in Asia probably several decades in the future.
Note the general trend of the circled heavy lines. When the primary school enrollment ratios are high (Figure 1 ), so are the secondary and tertiary enrollment ratios (Figure 2 ), although the trend of tertiary enrollment ratios is not so pronounced. This seems to indicate that the educational system as a whole, not the primary, secondary, or tertiary education, is relevant for economic development. On the other hand, higher level of the primary education, once established, promotes secondary and tertiary education through popular demands and the social emphasis on education.
B. Openness
In 1987 World Development Report (World Bank, 1987) , among 41 developing economies, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore were classified as the only three countries consistently maintained strongly outward-looking trade policy and achieved rapid economic growth during . To them we may add Taiwan. 13 In recent years, Sachs and Warner (1995, 1996) argue that the mere act of openness to trade is highly influential on economic growth. In twenty-year period, they calculate, a country that is always open would grow almost 50% faster than a country that is always closed (ibid, 1996) . In another paper, Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1995) have shown that it is more effective in increasing a developing country's
TFP the more open it is to trade with the industrial countries, as measured by the import share in GDP.
They also found the fact that with whom a country is associated is crucial.
"A developing country whose trade is more biased towards industrial countries that have large cumulative experiences in R&D has higher productivity."
And among the developed countries, There are at least three main channels through which international trade effects on economic growth (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Coe, et al., 1995) : Imports of intermediate materials and capital equipment, which are not available domestically; cross-border learning of organizational technology and product design; and imitation of production technology (Ito, 1986) . These effects are basically through import activities. In the cases of Korea and Taiwan, these benefits from importing industrial raw materials and capital equipment from Japan have been enhanced more than any other countries through cultural similarity and prewar historical linkages (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1995a) .
On the export side, especially in cases of exports through component-supply subcontracting and original equipment manufacturing (OEM), the demand for lower prices, faster delivery, and specification contracting from foreign buyers also lead to organizational innovation, industrial upgrading, and off-shore sourcing (Gereffi, 1995) . In the cases of NIEs, due to increasing competition from the ASEAN countries and China, exporters even move beyond OEM to establish original brand-name manufacturing in various industries, or retool to export higher value-added products, thereby stimulating economic growth of entire country (Hsiao, M., 1987) . In the early 1990s, Korea sold Hyundai (automobile), Leading Edge (computer), and many household appliances under the name of Samsung and Goldstar. Taiwan is also known for Acer and Mitac computers, Giant bicycles, Pro-Kennex tennis rackets, and Travel Fox shoes (Gereffi, 1995; Hobday, 1995, 193) . These products are especially aimed at extremely competitive, but almost completely open, U.S. markets, their number one exporting country for over thirty-five years.
Here lies the stark contrast between the East Asian economies and the former Soviet economy. "Soviet's products were exported mainly to 'captive consumers' like the COMECON member countries in East Europe, where transactions were settled with the nonconvertible "transferable ruble." Low quality products manufactured in the Soviet Union were not marketable in the free world" (Taniuchi, 1995, 10) .
..…………..……….. Place Table 2 here …………………….. Table 2 shows the growth of foreign trade among different countries and regions from 1980 to 1991. We first construct a world trade table, the rows of which show exporting countries, and the columns, importing countries. We then calculate the growth ratio of each country or region between 1980 and 1991, taking the exports (or imports) of 1980 as one. The method is partially shown in the last two columns. They show the world imports in billion U.S.
dollars for 1980 and 1991, respectively. The "world" column is then obtained by dividing "Wld91" column by "Wld80" column. For simplicity, all other original data are not presented.
Only the ratios are shown in the table. Thus, 5.6 in the first column means that the NIEs' intraregional trade increased 5.6 times from 1980 (that is, from US$ 6.99 billion in 1980, not shown in the table, same as below) to 1991 (at US$ 38.93 billion), and 1.9 in the intersection of the "world" row and the "world" column means that world's trade increased 1.9 times from 1980 (at US$ 1,897.6 billion in the "Wld80" column) to 1991 (at US$ 3,577.7 billion in the "Wld91" column). To perceive the magnitude of trade of the Asian NIEs, the last "NIES80" row shows the NIEs' exports to each country or region in 1980, and the "NI80" column shows the NIEs' imports from each country or region, all in billions of U.S. dollars.
The table indicates the vitality and dynamism of Asian countries as a trading block. The intra-regional trade among the NIEs increased 5.6 times, which is almost three times faster than the growth of world trade (1.9 times) and the intra-EC trade (2.2 times). The Asian NIEs' exports to Japan increased 4.2 times (the first row), more than doubling the growth of world trade, and to China, increased 18 times, almost 10 times faster than the world rate. Their exports to the United States (4.0) and EC (3.9) also increased four times, at least twice faster than the growth of world trade, but slower than their penetration to the Japanese market (4.2), during the 1980-1991 period.
Under the pressure from the United States, the domestic markets of the NIEs also opened for imports. Their imports from Japan (3.5 in the first column)), USA (3.2), and EC (3.7), increased more than three times, and from China, 7.6 times, all at least 50 percent faster than the world trade.
The shaded "sum" row and the "sum" column show the Asian region as a trading block.
NIEs' exports to other Asian countries increased 5.2 times, while their imports from other Asian countries increased 4.2 times. The intra-Asian regional trade increased 3.5 times, about 80%
higher than the world growth rate. "Asian dynamism" is more revealing in the last two columns. China exceeded the amount of trade of Japan or the United States, although still far less than the EC countries. However, if we consider the major APEC countries, including Japan and the United States, then the volume of trade among APEC countries (US$ 1212 billion) will be close to that of the EC countries (US$ 1368 billion).
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We submit that the mere fact that the NIEs had the ability to sustain its rapid GDP growth for the past three decades through ever increasing exports is a manifestation that resource allocation in the NIEs is, in general, more efficient than the other developing countries, and physical and managerial technologies did play an important role in upgrading the products and enlarging their markets in highly competitive developed countries, especially the United States.
These points will be elaborated in the following sections.
III. Pacific Trade Triangle and Technology Transfer

A. Direction of Trade
In previous papers (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1989 , 1995a , 1995b , we have shown that, from the end of World War II to the 1980s, Korean and Taiwanese trade relies heavily on Japan and the United States: Japan for imports of intermediate goods and capital equipment, and the United
States for exports of manufactured goods (also see Park and Park, 1989) . Furthermore, increases in Korean and Taiwanese exports to the United States have paralleled by their increases in imports from Japan. The parallel relationship is more pronounced the faster the economy grows, and clearer when we compare the categories of traded commodities. This pattern of trade has been repeated for Korea since the mid-1970s, and for Taiwan since the mid-1960s (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1995a, 235) . -
The situation is quite different with the United States. Before 1967, Taiwan indicating that the more Taiwan tries to increase its exports, whether to the United States or other countries, the more Taiwan has to rely on imports of materials and capital equipment from Japan.
Despite almost desperate efforts by the government, 17 Taiwan simply cannot elude its dependency on Japan!
In another paper (Hsiao, M., 1996) , it was found that there is a long-run relationship (cointegration) between Korean and Taiwanese exports to the United States and their imports from Japan. This long-run relationship has enabled the Taiwanese, and for that matter, the Koreans, to learn production and managerial technologies from the two most industrialized countries, and propelled their sustainable endogenous economic growth. from Japan and the United States are quite stable. All five major imports from Japan and four from the United States before 1982 continued to be so in 1992, except that the name of the category of "iron and steel" was replaced by "basic metals and articles," "Chemicals and
Pharmaceutics" by "Chemicals", and "machine and tools" by "machine and electric equipment,"
reflecting clearly the advancement of technology on the import side. The changes are shown in bold face. Furthermore, the proportion of "machine and tools", and "transportation equipment," as well as "basic metals and articles" in the case of imports from Japan and the United States, and "chemicals" in the case of imports from the United States, increased greatly both absolutely and relatively. In Figure 5 , imports of raw cotton were upgraded to "basic Metals and articles thereof." These changes clearly reflect the progress in industrialization and upgrading of technology.
Much more changes occur on the export side. Exports to Japan show a drastic change. Figure 6 shows the five largest items of Taiwan's export to Japan. Only textile products continued to be one of the five major export items in both 1982 and 1992. Other items before 1982, namely, plywood, bananas, sugar, canned food, were substituted by rubber and plastics, basic metals, machinery and electric equipment, and meat of swine in 1992. Thus, except meat of swine, other items show clearly the increase in the importance of capital and technology intensive export items. The considerable increase of item "Others" also indicates the 13 diversification of exports items to Japan.
In Figure 7 , for the Taiwanese exports to the United States, three export items, textile products, rubber and plastic products, basic metals continued to be important and increasing.
They have increased greatly in the 1980s, showing the competitiveness of Taiwanese products in the U.S. markets (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1995b 
IV. Revealed Comparative Advantage
These patterns of technological upgrading of trading contents also have taken place in other Asian NIEs. Instead of repeating the same presentation of the previous section, Table 3 summarizes the revealed comparative advantage 20 (RCA) of the NIEs in the OECD market, mostly with the United States and Japan. The RCA for each of the four NIEs in each of the 13 product groups is calculated for every five years starting from 1965 to 1990, a total of six different years, as given in Chow and Kellman (1993, Column 4 lists the economies that made the change, or did not make the change (the names in the parentheses). Apparently, the two small city states, Hong Kong (H) and Singapore (S), made the most changes, followed by Taiwan (T), and then Korea (K). This may indicate that the smaller an economy, the easier or more flexible to change its industrial structure.
In general, the increases in RCA of capital and technology intensive exports and reduction of labor-intensive exports show clearly the technical advancement of the Asian NIEs.
These are not reflected in total factor productivity analysis.
V. The Effects of Direct Foreign Investment
A. Inward Direct Foreign Investment
Along with trade, direct foreign investment (DFI) is another vehicle of technology transfer. It is another method of transferring engineering/production and management/marketing technologies, especially through the presence of foreign personnel employed in foreign or jointly owned firms. 21 The presence of Japanese personnel was undoubtedly more effective in Taiwan and Korea since many Taiwanese and Koreans could speak Japanese during the early stages of post-war economic development (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1995a, 240; Hsiao, M. 1992) . While critics like to label DFI as the vanguard of imperialist capitalism and foreign control of the host country, it is also considered as a major channel to bring technological know-how to the host country, creating backward and forward linkages which stimulate the local development of industry under certain conditions (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1995a, 237-241) .
In this section, we use the Taiwanese case as an example (ibid) to show DFI activity in the Asian NIEs, and how technology is transferred through DFI. In the early 1950s, among the newly independent former colonies, Taiwan was probably the first country that invited the much-
suspected DFI with open arms 22 . Seeing Taiwan's success, other Asian NIEs followed suit, and then followed by China and the ASEAN countries. The Taiwanese economy has never been so strong.
Altogether, from 1952 to 1999, 11,111 cases (shown by the solid line with circles in Figure 8 ) with the amount of US$ 37 billion (in nominal values 26 ) of DFI were approved for IF and IC. Among IF, Japan is the largest contributor with 3,230 cases (US$ 8.3 billion), followed closely by the U.S.A., accounting for 1,694 cases (8.7b), Europe, for 928 cases (4.1b). Other countries were responsible for 2,562 cases (12b). The bulk of DFI has occurred only recently (TSDB, 2000, 260) .
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In general, from 1952 to 1999, 26% of Taiwan's DFI has been in electronic and electric products, totaling US$ 9.4 billion in 1,544 cases. This is followed by "other products," 13%, US$ 4.8 billion in 1,927 cases; banking and insurance, 13%, US$ 4.6 billion in 502 cases. None or very few DFI were in agriculture, fisheries and livestock, paper and paper products and construction (TSDB, 2000, 261) . Among the foreign investment (IF), the lion's share also goes to electronic and electric products (9.2b/1,339 cases), followed by chemicals (3.7b/470 cases), services (3.2b/1229 cases), foreign trade (2.5b/1,754 cases), and machinery, equipment and instrument (1.6b/431 cases) (ibid.). Indeed, through forward and backward linkages, foreign capital had a significant positive effect on the growth of Taiwan's real GDP, 27 and has helped build Taiwan as the kingdom of electronics and computers. 28 For a developing country like Taiwan, the major objective of inducing DFI is to enhance technological program and increase the nation's economic activities. In a previous paper (M. Hsiao, 1992) , it is shown that, using the 1967 to 1987 data set, the growth of real DFI has had a significant and positive effect on the growth of real GDP. When the growth rate of real DFI increases by 1%, it may generate a 0.11% increase in the growth rate of real GDP. IF concentrates investment in high-tech and heavy industries, generating more economic activity for the Taiwanese economy.
At least in two surveys in the past, it was shown that foreign firms have a tendency of being three to seven times higher than the national firms to adopt foreign technology. This is shown in Figure 9 . In each category, the darker column shows the percentage of total firms surveyed, and the lighter column shows the percentage of firms in the electronic and electric products (or "electronics" in short) industry. In the 1973 survey of 311 large exporters in Taiwan, the percentage of firms adopting foreign technology was 39% (76% in the electronic industry). If the firms are divided into national firms (natn'l), minority owned foreign firms (mino), and majority owned foreign firms (majo), then 8%, 61%, and 91% of the firms in each category, respectively (or 24%, 71%, and 100% of the electronics firms), introduced foreign technology. 29 The larger the foreign investment in a firm, the higher the possibility that the firm adopts foreign technology, generating technical progress.
……………………..
Place Figure 9 here ……………………..
Similarly, the middle part of Figure 9 shows that, in the 1978 survey of 199 major producers, 30 the percentage of firms adopting foreign technology was 38%, and among the 17 electronics industry, it was 50%. More specifically, the percentage of firms adopting foreign technology was 21% for national firms, but 71% for foreign firms. The percentage in electronics industry is lower in the national firms (13%) and much higher in the foreign firms (96%), which are shown by the lighter bars. Thus the empirical rules suggest that technology transfer is an increasing function of DFI (Hsiao, M. 1992) . We have called this the slanted structure of technology transfer through DFI. The slant is shown by the light dotted lines in Figure 9 .
Note that, in the first part of the diagram, the slope of the first line segment connecting "natn'l" to "mino" is steeper than that of the second line segment connecting "mino" to "majo."
It seems to indicate that, so far as technical transfer is concerned, what count is some contacts with the foreign firms, whether the firms are minority-or majority-owned by the foreigners. This again verifies the argument for the openness of the economy.
The last part of Figure 9 shows the possibility of producing "new products" among the 199 firms surveyed, either through technology transfer, technological cooperation, or research and development. It is interesting to know that, on average, the Taiwanese national firms (68%, "natn'l") have a higher tendency to produce "new products" than the foreign firms (63%, "forgn"), although the difference between the two are not very large, and the electronic industry being excepted. In any case, contrary to the prediction of the Marxists and other pessimists, the national firms have not dominated or even crashed by the foreign firms. This indicates the vitality of Taiwanese people, and people in other NIEs, in the face of strong foreign competition.
This vitality has in turn contributed to the growth of Taiwanese economy and economies of other
NIEs. This part of technical progress is not adequately captured in the usual measurement of total productivity.
..…………..………..
Place Table 4 here ……………………..
B. Outward Direct Foreign Investment
As the NIEs grew by the mid-1980s, due to currency appreciation and rising wages, as we have seen in Section IV, the NIEs lost its comparative advantages in the labor-intensive industries. Unprecedented outward direct foreign investment of the NIEs took place in the second half of the 1980s. Table 4 shows the spurt of such investment in recent years. In a short threeyear period, the outward direct foreign investment of the NIEs to ASEAN increased 17 times.
Among them, the Taiwanese investment increased 40 times, due to early evaluation of New A good example of DFI and technology transfer is given by Taiwan's television industry (Hsiao and Hsiao, 1995a, 240-241) . It created forward and backward linkages in Taiwan, and thus contributed to Taiwanese industrialization. So was the transistor and condenser parts industry (Kawakami, 1999) . It is also a good example of product life-cycle theory in international trade and show clearly how an industry went through the stages of imports to import substitution, and then to exports. To go back to the Krugman's argument, this is not like the former Soviet economy, which skipped these steps and tried to develop heavy industry by using government planning and decrees without due consideration to the demands for the products by users and consumers. In fact, what Krugman really argues is that the failure of industrial policies of the former Soviet government, which ignored international market forces. innovation. These are some factors not measured in the computation of total factor productivity.
VI. Coefficients of Learning
In the previous sections of this paper, we took pain to show that, unlike Krugman's assertion, the NIEs have been climbing the technology ladder during the last three decades. They learned and advanced technology through education, foreign trade, and inward and outward direct foreign investment so that they can stay competitive in the world and maintained its rapid growth. This section measures how Taiwan and Korea learned from their mentors and powerful neighbors, Japan and the United States.
A. A Simple Model of Learning
One of the recent concerns in the literature on economic growth is whether the developing countries are catching up with the developed countries in the long run. Catching up can be achieved mainly through technology transfer and spillover between two trading partners through learning. In this section, we would like to set up a simple model of learning between the developing and developed countries.
It is now well known that openness to trade can promote economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995) . We have observed in section III that it is also important with which country a developing country is trading. Indeed, the formation of the Pacific trade triangle among Japan, Taiwan and Korea, and the United States has been an engine of growth of Taiwan and Korea (M. Hsiao, 1998) . It is generally assumed that the wider the gap of real GDP per capita between the two trading partners, the faster the learning process and the larger the effect of learning. Let y and y* be real GDP per capita of developing and developed countries, respectively. Then ln (y*/y) = ln y* -ln y is taken as an indicator of the "advantages of backwardness" (Gerschenkron, 1962) , that is, a technological gap which can be exploited by the developing countries like Taiwan and Korea.
Following Nelson and Phelps (1966) and more recently Verspagen (1994) , the real GDP per 20 capita growth rate of a developing country, denoted as d(ln y)/dt, is proportional to the discrepancy between developed and developing countries' real GDP per capita (in logarithm):
where α is a constant coefficient that measures the degree of learning through technological transfer or imitation of industries in the developing countries. 32 It is the usual speed of adjustment, ranging from zero to one, and may be called more explicitly as the coefficient of learning or catching up. 33 When α = 0, there is no learning and so no growth takes place, and when α = 1, the growth rate equals to the income discrepancy (in logarithm).
The above equation may be written in discrete form for statistical estimation:
ln y t -ln y t-1 = a(ln y* t-1 -ln y t-1 )
We use the data from Maddison (1995) , in which GDP per capita is measured in 1990 GearyKhamis dollars. The data are available from the early 1900s to 1992 for Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. Thus, we may also compare the learning coefficients of Korea and Japan between the prewar and the postwar periods. Figure 10 shows the values of α for the learning process of pairs of countries, Taiwan with Japan (T, in a heavy solid line), Korea with Japan (K, in a dotted line), Japan with the United States (J, in a light solid line). Similarly, we also calculate the coefficients of learning for Taiwan with the United States, and Korea with the United States. The descriptive statistics of α are presented in Table 6 . Ignoring the transition period , for all three periods, total, prewar and postwar, Japan with the United States generally has the highest average value of the coefficients, followed by Taiwan and Korea with Japan, and then Taiwan and Korea with the United States. At the same time, the coefficient of Japan with the United States fluctuates more (larger standard deviation) than those of Taiwan and Korea with Japan, but less than those of Taiwan and Korea with the United States. This is true for all the three periods. These findings are consistent with our previous observations. They indicate that technology transfer from Japan to Taiwan and Korea is more important than that from the United States to Taiwan and Korea.
Note the difference in the values of coefficient α in the prewar and the postwar periods in Figure 10 . For all three cases in the diagram, the range of the prewar coefficients is much larger than the range of the postwar period, showing the erratic nature of learning process in the prewar period.
-----------------------------------------
Place Figure 10 and Table 6 here
Before the war, Taiwan experienced largest fluctuations in the coefficient α, followed by Korea, and then Japan. The positive learning coefficients seem to cancel out by the negative ones, although the net results seem to be positive. This explains the slow growth of the prewar period for all three countries. The postwar coefficients behaved quite differently. The coefficients are mostly positive. However, there is a clear difference among the three pairs of the countries. Throughout the three periods, Japan's learning coefficients with the United States are consistently the highest, especially during the late 1960s and late 1980s, followed by Taiwan and Korea with Japan. Taiwan's learning coefficient with the United States is also higher than that of Korea in the prewar and the postwar periods. Apparently, the difference in the learning ability of Taiwan, Korea, and Japan explains at least partly the difference in growth rates of the three countries.
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Given the growth rates and the coefficients of learning in the past, in a separate paper (Hsiao and Hsiao, 2000) , we have examined whether real GDP per capita of Taiwan and Korea could catch up with that of Japan and the United States in the future. By combining a logistic model of growth and time series analysis using Perron's test of trend stationarity, we were able to show that real GDP per capita of both Taiwan and Korea converges to that of Japan and the United States, although the speed of convergence is slow. Thus, while diminishing returns will eventually set in and the economic growth rate of NIEs may be tapering off, the convergence of the Taiwanese and Korean economy to the advanced countries like Japan and the United States may ultimately realized. In fact, Table 1 shows that Singapore's nominal GDP per capita already almost caught up with that of the United States 35 in 1999.
B. Estimation of the Long-Run Coefficients of Learning
When we assume that the growth rate of real GDP per capita, ln y t -ln y t-1, is a distributed lag function of the indicator of the advantages of backwardness, ln y* t-1 -ln y t-1, the long-run learning relationship between two countries can be written as the finite distributed lag model β j (ln y* t-j-1 -ln y t-j-1 ) + e t ,
where k is the lag length, β j 's are the distributed lag weights, and e t is the error term. We apply the technique of Almon distributed lag (also called the polynomial distributed lag) to estimate the coefficients β j 's in the model, that is,
where p is the degree of polynomial, and γ i 's are polynomial coefficients. The sum of β j 's is the longrun coefficient of learning, which represents the long-run effect from the discrepancies in the real GDP per capita between an advanced country (Japan or the United States) and the less advanced country (Taiwan or Korea) on the growth rate of real GDP per capita of the less advanced country. Table 7 is a concave quadratic function (p = 2). We have estimated the model from the lag length equals to one to the lag length equals to eight, and the optimal lag length k is chosen by the minimum Akaike information criterion (AIC).
-----------------------
Place Table 7 here
The most interesting and striking results that we have obtained are the case of Taiwan with Japan. From the total period, the long-run coefficient of learning is 0.101, which is positive and significant at the 5% level. This means that, historically, Taiwan's GDP per capita growth has benefited from the learning with Japan. In addition, from the postwar period, the long-run learning coefficient is 0.046, which is also positive and significant at the 5% level. This implies that Taiwan has continuously learned from Japan, the advanced neighboring country, even after 23 the war. This is consistent with our observations in the previous papers Hsiao, 1995a, 2001a; M. Hsiao, 1992) .
The results also show ironically that, like Taiwan, Korea also learned greatly from Japan through out the total period, but when we divided the total period into the prewar and the postwar periods, then the coefficients become not significant.
Our results also reveal that both Taiwan and Korea did not seem to learn much from the United States, as their estimated coefficients are generally small, even have wrong sign and significant. This probably is the case, since the gaps of the per capita income between Taiwan (and Korea) and the United States are so far apart, at least before the 1990s that the former countries are too far behind to learn advanced technology from the United States, the most advanced country in the world. This interpretation seems consistent with the relationship between Japan and the United States. Overall long-run learning coefficient of Japan with the United States is 0.012 but it is not at all significant. When the total period is divided into the prewar and postwar periods, the prewar coefficient has wrong sign and is very insignificant, but the postwar coefficient is 0.026 and significant at the 5% level, showing Japanese learning from, and catching up with, the United States in the postwar period. Unlike Taiwan or Korea, the GDP per capita difference between Japan and the United States are closer and Japan was able to learn with the United States in the postwar period.
Lastly, note that the values of estimated learning coefficients in Table 7 are generally very close to the average coefficients in the descriptive statistics in Table 6 . No particularly unusual difference between the four statistically significant coefficients in Table 7 and the corresponding average coefficients in Table 6 . All of them have positive sign and are fractions. This seems to suggest that our econometric results are consistent with the sample observations.
VII. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have examined Krugman's second proposition that in an input-driven growth, the law of diminishing returns will eventually set in, as the former Soviet economy once did and collapsed. There are three major strategies to overcome diminishing returns. They are improvement in education, increase in openness, and expansion of domestic R & D. Until the mid-1990s, the NIEs relied mainly on the first and the last strategies to counter diminishing returns and achieved rapid economic growth, the "miracle." We have argued in detail that 24 technology could, and, in fact, did, transfer through import and export activities, and also through inward direct foreign investment in the NIEs.
Is Krugman right in view of recent financial crisis (1997) (1998) and the slowdown of the growth rates of the NIEs and Asian countries? Korea and ASEAN-3 countries are severely affected, although other three NIEs had relatively minor recession. 36 However, Krugman (1997) believes that the crisis has little direct bearing with Asia's long-run growth prospects. 37 In fact, after accepting the rescue packages from international organizations, the financial reform and restructuring programs of these countries seem working, and the recovery from recession already in sight by the end of 1999. The recent prediction of the Asian Development Bank (2000, 242-243) is that the growth rates of real GDP (and real GDP per capita) for Taiwan Asian companies are so prominent and powerful that even the hard-to-crack Japanese companies started to purchase parts and supplies from non-Japanese Asian firms. As a consequence, Suzuoki (1996) observes the beginning of the collapse of Japan's notorious Keiretsu, although the NIEs' challenge to Japan still at an early stage (Hobday, 1995, 201) .
The success of the technological upgrading may be seen again from the Taiwanese story.
The left-hand side of Table 8 shows the world market share of Taiwan's exports of some high- 25 tech products in 1991 and 1993, ranked from number one to number three in the world export markets. For example, in 1993, Taiwan supplied 76% of the world's exports of handheld scanners for personal computers, 62% of CPU's, 51% of monitors, etc. The Taiwanese achievement is indeed astounding. There were 10 items ranked number one, three items in number 2, and five items in number 3, in the world export markets in 1993. In terms of production in 1995, Taiwan produced more than 10% of world's personal computers 38 , and her production of keyboards and motherboards ranked number one in the world (Nikkei, February 11, 1996) . Table 8 shows that they, along with many others, were still Number One at whopping 65% or so of the world share in 1998, although the production of keyboard started to decreasing.
The right-hand-side of Table 8 (Nikkei, February 11, 1996) , and, in some area, Taiwan's computer technology 39 is now comparable, if not better, than Japan's. Table 9 shows an estimation of technological competitiveness of Taiwanese computer products by the Nikkei Business Journal. Taiwanese made motherboards and desktop personal computers are more competitive than Japan, and their motherboards are as competitive as those made in the United States. Similar statement can be made of Korea (Yu and Choi, 1995) . Technology not only has transferred to the NIEs, native technology also begins to burgeon. We should emphasize again that these are something that cannot be measured in the conventional TFP analysis.
Place Table 9 here ……………………..
So long as the NIEs continue to improve its educational level, maintain export promotion policy and keep the market open, and nurture local research and development, upgrading computer and information technology, preserving macroeconomic stability, especially keeping inflation rate moderate (Rodrick, 1996) , then, in view of recent studies of the relation between information technology and the U.S. economic growth (Jorgenson, 2001; Stiroh, 2001) 3 Hsiao, 1996. Abe (1996) has made a survey of the related literature in Japanese and English, including our paper. 5 The real interest rate q' is defined as the interest rate on short and intermediate term loans minus the inflation rate of the wholesale price index. We calculate the simple average from the table given in EPA (1995, 189) . Similar calculation is given in Knoester and Mak (1994) , who estimate it by the nominal long-term interest rate net of the inflation rate of the consumer price.
6 This argument is presented in an appendix of EPA (1995), using the Cobb-Douglas production function. Note that higher real interest rate also implies higher opportunity cost of educational investment and equipment investment. The fact that these two kinds of investment being higher in the NIEs implies higher rate of capital returns for these two kinds of investment in these countries. On the other hand, it may also be argued that higher capital cost fosters efficient allocation of capital, and encourages the choice of higher-return investment projects, thus spurs economic growth (ibid, 189).
institutional reform for postwar rapid growth was already established by the end of the war (Hsiao and Hsiao, 2001a) .
12 Figure 2 is based on World Bank (1984 and 1992) . The numbers with asterisk are 1985 data, the others are 1989 data. Taiwan's figures are calculated from TSDB (1995, 13, 265) . The secondary enrollment age group is generally 12 to 17 years old. Taiwan's figures are based on 15 to 19 age group. There is a discrepancy in Taiwan's secondary education enrollment ratios in Figures 1 and 2 due to different sources of data.
13 Ranis, 1992 . For a recent survey of literature on openness and growth, see Edwards, 1993, and Helleiner, 1990. 14 See TSDB, 2000. All percentages in this paragraph are calculated in nominal values. In the 1960's and the 1970's, Marxists (especially, Chinese economists) and the Dependencia Scholars described the economies of the newly industrialized countries as shadow, dependent, exploited, or semi-colonial.
15 Table 2 shows clearly that trade openness, especially export activities, is an East and Southeast Asian phenomena. The whole region has been involved in trading activities. Thus, it is not tenuous to attribute Taiwan's success of the exports solely to a wise government policy. 17 The following episode is illuminating. In February 1982, to reduce US$ 3.2 billion trade deficit with Japan, Taiwan surprised the world by unilaterally banning imports from Japan more than 1,500 commodities for an indefinite time, and heavy trucks and diesel engines for one year. Tokyo threatened to cancel Taiwan's preferential tariff and trade status. The ban inflicted serious damage to Taiwanese exports and its national economy. As Tokyo also could not wage a trade war simultaneously with the U.S. and the EEC, both sides reached a compromise and the ban on half of the goods were lifted by November that year. For details, see Arnold, 1985, 194-196; Aoki, 1985, 157. 18 Since 1982, the Taiwan government promoted biotechnology aggressively. It failed to thrive, no new drug has been introduced, and there is only one listed biotech firm (Apex Biotechnology) in Taiwan (Chuang, 2000) . "Most funding recipients have been large-scale firms that focus not on R&D but on the manufacture of generics or bulk pharmaceutical chemicals" (ibid., 43). In addition to the government misconception and misdirection, we submit that, unlike computer and semiconductor industry, technical transfer from foreign countries, especially from Japan, whose biotech industry is also weak, is not readily available. Chuang reported the lack of government supports of small local R&D firms, and the lack of partnership among university research, government funding, and biotech industry, etc. Few Taiwan scholars discuss this area of government failure.
19 The commodity classification used in the figures is based on the Chinese Commodity Classification (CCC) system, which is different from the SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) Code.
20 Here RCA ik is defined as the ith country's commodity k import (M ik ) share in country i's total imports (M i ) divided by the OECD's kth commodity import (Wk) share in the total OECD imports (W), that is, RCA ik = (M ik /M i )/(W k /W). If it is greater than 1, we say ith country has RCA of commodity k. If it is less than 1, then the ith country has no RCA of commodity k. See Chow and Kellman (1993, 15 36 Hsiao and Hsiao (2001b) have compared the impacts of financial crisis on the Korean and Taiwanese economies. They found that in both countries, the macroeconomic fundamentals are basically similar, except the international financial sector. The also found that a unidirectional causality from the ratio of the external short-term debt to international reserves to foreign exchange rate in the case of Korea, but no causality was found in the case of Taiwan. 70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91 70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91 
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